I build business plans that will stand up to investors’ questions; define margins that can hold under a pricing review; manage contract manufacturers who cannot keep their promises; and turn lab prototypes into marketable products.
Based in Ghent, Belgium. I work across Europe.
Each industry I worked in involves turning a lab invention into a marketable product through outside partners. There are always regulatory hurdles we need to jump through. The cash is always tight, no matter what stage the company is in: a start-up getting its first product out, an established business standing up a new unit, and a company crossing into commercial production.
Assay, instrument and consumable to market. Phase-gated development, design control, ISO 13485, reagent and disposable supply.
Scientist to COO, across three companies in the sector.
Prototype to manufacturable product. Engineering partners, supplier base, production capacity, customer support.
COO, instrument start-up, 2019–2022. Instrument hardware later in diagnostics.
Technology transfer, scale-up with a contract manufacturer, supply agreements, customer audits and the quality system underneath them.
COO since 2024.
No matter the industry, the size of the company or the stage it is at, these are the six things that turn up almost every time, and none of them is the problem the company thinks it has.
I ask three people what the company is trying to achieve this year, and I get three different answers. All of them seem to sound reasonable, but they pull in different directions. Nothing is written down, and they say they don’t know what the other teams are working on.
Starting a project needs one yes from somebody senior. Stopping one has no route at all: no gate, no criteria, and no budget holder who can call it. So the list only grows. The team is spread across every item on it, each one is a priority, and when I ask for the status of a project I get an opinion rather than a date. Nobody can tell me what has been spent on it either.
I’ve worked with tech companies that built amazingly cool things. The team developing the products are very thorough too: the problem statement, the customer’s pain, what they would pay for a solution — all of them are considered, and all of them are completely imaginary. The product ends up technically excellent but commercially unasked for.
In a young company everybody works in harmony, enthusiastically covering whatever needs covering. As the company grows, things start to get more difficult and less efficient. Frustrations build among the team. There are duplicated efforts, conflicting decisions, and no clear answer to who was supposed to own what.
Make or buy, the sale price, the break-even point: these discussions run for hours. Everybody has a view and everybody is confident. But when I ask where a number came from, it came from another meeting, or from a supplier indication two years old, or from a spreadsheet nobody owns. And nobody goes back afterwards to compare it with what the thing actually cost.
A board pack that reports progress only tells the board what has already happened. Revenue against plan, a few project updates, a timeline. What it does not carry is the risk: what could stop the plan, how likely that is, what it would cost in margin and in runway, who owns it and by when. Without that the board can note a slip, but it cannot act before the slip happens.
All six are the same problem: the company has no operating system. How I install one →
I group my experience into three kinds of work: the commercial judgement that sets a company’s direction, the operations that deliver the product, and how the company is run.
I build business plans and cases top-down and then verify bottom-up: what it will take, what it will cost to build and to run, what it has to return and by when. The numbers are checked by actually talking to prospects and business partners.
ExperienceAs COO, I owned the business plan and P&L of a new Dx business unit against a €20M programme budget, deciding what it would and would not build, on a 30%+ gross-margin base case. At a biotech, I rebuilt the company business plan from the capital and operating budgets up.
All-in cost is not just about what your CMOs charge you for raw materials, labour, facility rental and so on. It also includes the cost of testing, storing and intracompany product transfer. Understanding what customers are willing to pay requires physically approaching them and gathering market intelligence. Often neglected are the commercial terms: volume, exclusivity, quality obligations, payment terms and schedule. All of the above quietly decide whether the margin survives.
ExperienceFor an instrument and consumable business, set cost of goods and selling price together to a 30%+ gross margin. At a biotech, set sale price and cost of goods from quoted and measured costs rather than estimates, and did the same for an IVD programme. Negotiated supply and quality agreements with multinationals, and passed manufacturing site quality audits.
I highly recommend board reports with a fixed structure and narratives, and not just some static graphs with a few bullet points. I believe it would give each board member more context, and make the board meeting a more informed, focused discussion. The report should cover the company’s finances, its business, and the key topics that reflect the stage the company is at. In any case, each section should include a quantifiable risk reporting against timeline, budget and quality, each with a mitigation, an owner and a date, so the board has something to decide rather than only to note.
ExperienceA direct reporting line to the board in every COO role. Reported periodically: the operating budget against actuals, cost of goods and profit margin, inventory value, the manufacturing plan, key project progress, quality issues and customer feedback — each with its risks, the mitigation in hand, and the decision I needed the board to take.
Even when I thought we knew the process inside out, getting it into an external production facility with reliable reproducibility and quality was a completely different level. Before tech transfer, I make sure we actually know our process window: not just how to make it work, but where the limits are at which it stops working. This is then used as a blueprint for the CMOs to further develop our process within their facility.
ExperienceI have led two industrialisations with almost nothing physically in common. An integrated diagnostic platform, with the manufacturing lines for its consumables and reagents qualified. And a fermentation process from 5 and 30 L in the laboratory, through an 8 m³ pilot, to 120 m³ commercial scale.
Make or buy is a calculation, not a default. I compare the all-in internal cost against the quoted external one, including the parts that get left out: incoming inspection, release testing, storage, transport, and the working capital tied up in a minimum order quantity. Then the supplier work itself. Shortlisting the ones who actually want a volume your size, negotiating the supply agreement and the quality agreement together, and running a review often enough to hear that a batch is at risk before it is late. Outsourcing buys their lead time as well as their capacity, so production planning starts from a date you do not set.
ExperienceManaged the engineering house, software developer and contract manufacturers behind diagnostic instruments and plastic disposables, then led technology transfer with a contract manufacturer for a fermentation process. I have worked with contract manufacturers across Asia and Europe, in biotech and biologics as well as diagnostics and hardware, and run supply chain and production planning across an entirely outsourced model.
A quality system written for the audit gets you the certificate and nothing more. I build it into the processes the company already runs: document control, change control, CAPA, supplier qualification, and design history where the product needs one. The procedures are drafted in the words the team already uses, by the people who do the work, so the system is followed between audits and not only before them. ISO 9001 or ISO 13485, depending on what you sell.
ExperienceISO 13485 achieved at an IVD platform company, and its scope later extended to cover instrument hardware and software at a molecular diagnostics group. ISO 9001:2015 achieved at an instrument start-up. At a biotech, quality built as an internal function rather than bought in.
One set of objectives for the year, ranked, and cascaded to team level so everybody can name the ones they own. Ranking is the part that gets skipped, and it is the part that decides what gets dropped when the quarter is short. Each objective needs a measure, a name against it and a deadline, written somewhere everybody can see. Then the meeting rhythm that keeps them current: a short weekly on the measures and the blockers, and a quarterly to review what was delivered and set the next period.
ExperienceIntroduced OKRs and EOS as the working method, aligned the company objectives and cascaded them to each team. Ran the routine meetings that review the measures, clear roadblocks and re-cut the plan, and built the dashboard that made all of it visible across teams.
Agreed before the work starts: the deliverables, the dates, the owner and the budget. Then phase gates, with the criteria written in advance, where no is a permitted answer. The gate is worth more than the plan. A project nobody can stop keeps consuming people and budget long after the reason for it has gone, and that cost never appears in any report.
ExperienceI have run every company this way, and I have used the gates to stop things: an external engineering partner halted mid-programme, where the objectives and the governance had never been agreed, and the work restarted with another; and research with no commercial outlook, so the team could finish what the market was actually asking for.
Who owns what, who decides what, and what everybody else can expect from them. I write this down before the hiring rather than after the frustration: an organisation chart, a short accountability for each role, and the decisions that role can take on its own. Most of the friction I am asked to fix is not between people. It is two roles that were never told which of them decides.
ExperienceAt a start-up of around 25 people, built R&D, manufacturing, quality and customer service with field servicing, 15 of them reporting to me. At a molecular diagnostics group, added project management, systems engineering and HR past 40. At a biotech, redefined roles and responsibilities, brought quality in-house and appointed an HR director.
Something else? If it sits between R&D, operations and finance, it is probably in scope. Please ask on LinkedIn →
“Something is wrong and we don’t agree on what.”
An independent assessment. I establish the root causes from outside the argument, test the assumptions the plan rests on, and write up the options with what each one costs and what it would take. Commissioned by the company, or by an investor before they put money in.
“The board needs the plan, and nobody here has the hours.”
One project, start to handover. A business plan, a technology transfer, a gap in the quality system closed. You get the result itself and the documents behind it: the model, the procedures, the supplier files, whatever your team needs to run it without me.
“We are between leaders and the plan cannot wait.”
I hold the role while you search. The team keeps a manager, the board keeps its reporting, and the plan keeps moving. I also help write the brief and sit in on the interviews for whoever takes it permanently.
It is me you work with, start to finish. Three steps, and before anything begins you know the scope, the deliverable and the date it ends.
Send me a message on LinkedIn. The problem and roughly when you need it solved is plenty — you do not need to prepare anything, and you should not tell me anything sensitive yet. If it looks like something I can help with, we find half an hour to talk. That first call is mostly the two of us getting to know each other and me getting a feel for what is going on.
Most companies would rather have an NDA in place before going further, and I will always offer one — yours or mine, whichever is less work for you. Then we can get into it properly: what is actually wrong, what you have already tried, where it is stuck, and what I could realistically do about it. Sometimes that conversation ends with me saying there is no job here. That is a perfectly good outcome, and you will have lost an hour.
Everything we worked out goes onto a single page: what I will deliver, who is doing what, when it lands, and what it costs. The fee is fixed against that scope rather than against hours, so the number does not move if the work takes me longer than I estimated. Nothing starts until you are happy with the page. It is short, and its only job is that neither of us is guessing in six weeks what was promised.
Then I get on with it. You hear from me at whatever rhythm suits you, usually a short written update to the sponsor once a week, so nobody has to chase me for one. If something changes and the scope has to move, we stop, re-scope in writing and agree the new dates and fee before carrying on. And it ends properly, with a documented handover to your team, so the work keeps running after I have gone. I would rather you did not need me again.
Both. Operations problems are rarely solved from a laptop: the answer is usually on the production floor, in the goods-in area, or in a spreadsheet somebody maintains by hand. So expect me on site for part of the time. I am based in Ghent and work across Europe.
An NDA before any detail is shared, yours or mine. I do not work for direct competitors in parallel, and I flag any conflict at the outset. That includes obligations to former clients, which usually outlast the engagement itself.
Ad hoc, interim or long-term: all three are possible, and which one it is comes out of the first conversation. Tell me the days per week and the start date you need, and I will tell you straight away whether I can give it.
I trained as a chemist and biochemist and spent my first years at the bench, designing microfluidic assays. What that work taught me, eventually, is that a result in a laboratory tells you nothing about whether anyone would buy the thing you have worked on for years. I moved to the side of the business where that question finally gets answered.
The part I do best is putting data under a decision. Give me a process everybody agrees is too slow and I will measure it: where the hours go, where the yield is lost, and what each step costs. Then the decision is made on those numbers rather than on who argues hardest, and the answer is almost never where the argument was.
After three COO positions I have run a business unit with its own plan, its own P&L and its own board. That is where the connections get made: why the business exists, what problem it solves, and what the invention is actually for. That is the work I want more of.
Before that, 10 years from bench scientist to Director Science & Technology at Biocartis in Switzerland and MyCartis in Belgium.
Alongside those roles, smaller projects taken on directly:
In a few sentences.
And what happens if it is missed.
The board, the chief executive, the team.
Start with a message on LinkedIn. If I am not the right person, I will say so and suggest who might be.
Message me on LinkedIn